As Mossad operations go, this one was technically impressive.
Not as impressive as what they helped pull off on 9/11 in New York.
But following the extraordinary operation that saw pagers explode in multiple Lebanese locations, the broader extent of Israel’s ‘act of sabotage’ (or act of terrorism – both definitions fit) have continued to become apparent.
With walkie-talkies being detonated the next day, injuring thousands more people: after thousands were already hospitalised from the initial attack and at least twelve people killed.
Reports also suggested some laptops, biometric devices, car radios, and even solar panels, also exploded.
If that’s true, then the extent of Israel’s infiltration of technology, manufacturing and shipping processes involving multiple companies in multiple locations is even more startling.
Many ordinary people have started to say they’re now scared of their own phones and devices: indicating that the psychological impact of these events are being felt far outside of Lebanon.
Questions are also raised about the extent to which an agency like Mossad has control of – or is able to hijack – technologies, companies or processes in foreign countries.
Not to mention the question of how easily our common tech devices can be weaponised against us at any time.
The attack in Lebanon, even if it was primarily targeted against Hezbollah members (which includes non-fighters, such as doctors, government workers, etc), has opened up a Pandora’s Box: both in terms of the nature of modern warfare and, more broadly, ordinary people’s trust in technology, manufacturing and big tech companies.
Western establishment media’s inability to consider this an act of terrorism also creates a problematic ambiguity as to whether operations like this are supposed to be considered acceptable or not.
Booby traps – not to mention simply planting explosives – are obviously criminal acts and illegal: let alone doing it in another country.
But some observers have treated this attack almost as if it’s fair game: as if they’re pretty much giving Mossad high-fives for their ingenuity.
Isn’t that creating a total ambiguity in international law? If it’s an illegal act, shouldn’t it be simply condemned?
Has this type of action now been legitimised? If some other state, non-state actor or rogue group manages to execute a plot like this in the future, would that be acceptable? Or would the perpetrators be hunted down?
And if any other country had carried it out, would there be any ambiguity in the language or reaction?
And how many foreign actors were involved in helping facilitate this operation? How many parties were complicit?
For one thing, it appears the American University in Beirut updated its own pager devices on August 29th.
That conceivably implies foreknowledge. Though it’s possible staff and administrators might’ve been advised by a higher source to update their devices without necessarily being told why or having any foreknowledge of the coming attack.
The Taiwan-based company cited as the origin of the pagers has subsequently pointed to a company in Hungary as being where these specific pagers were sent from.
A vague entity called BAC Consulting was implicated.
CEO Hsu Ching-kuang of Gold Apollo, the apparent distributor of the pagers, held a press conference stating that the pagers procured by Hezbollah were manufactured under license by this BAC Consulting entity.
The Hungarian company, run apparently by an Italian woman with some unspecified link to the European Commission, has only existed since 2022, has conducted no known business operations in that time, and only has one employee.
Now a report suggests that BAC Consulting actually collaborated with a Bulgarian company, Norta Global, based in the Bulgarian capital: which is where the booby-trapped devices were shipped from.
Bulgaria and Hungary are both members of NATO and the EU.
If it was Bulgaria, that’s interesting, because there’s a history of Bulgaria being involved in manufacturing processes for some nefarious foreign affairs operations.
To cite an example, it was from Bulgaria that the amphetamine Captagon was being produced: the drug that was fuelling a lot of the ISIS and other rebel fighters in Syria, Libya and Iraq during the most vicious periods of fighting.
I covered that whole subject here way back in 2015.
Clearly, Mossad doesn’t carry out operations like this entirely on its own: it has collaborators.
And in general, Mossad and Israeli operatives have been able to operate in foreign countries with impunity for years: which, as we’ve examined before, has relevance to all kinds of international incidents, from the Charlie Hebdo massacre and Paris terror attacks to 9/11 and numerous other examples.
Now the New York Times is claiming, based supposedly on the input of three unnamed intelligence agents with supposed knowledge of the operation, that rather than merely managing to tamper with the devices at some stage of their production or distribution, Israel actually “manufactured them as part of an elaborate ruse.”
According to them, BAC Consulting was one of four front-companies created to facilitate this operation.
The implication is also that this operational planning goes back to 2022 – significantly quite a while before the events of October 7th or Hezbollah’s subsequent firing of rockets into Northern Israel.
Which makes sense: this would’ve taken some time to set up.
But Israel’s foreign intelligence agency are masters of their trade. Which is why anyone still thinking they didn’t see October 7th coming is basically an idiot at this point.
In terms of concerns about the vulnerability of mobile devices and modern tech in general, a spreading of paranoia isn’t without justification.
All you have to do is consider Israel’s Pegasus spyware operations.
Pegasus is a spyware developed by the Israeli NSO Group, and is designed to be covertly and remotely installed on mobile phones running iOS and Android.
The Israelis define Pegasus as a product for fighting crime and terrorism, but governments around the world are known to have employed the spyware to target journalists, dissidents and activists.
As a case in point, in January 2022, it was indicated that phones belonging to Lama Fakih, a US-Lebanese citizen and senior figure in Human Rights Watch, were repeatedly hacked by a client of the Israeli NSO Group at the time when she was specifically investigating the 2020 Beirut explosion that killed more than 200 people and devastated the Lebanese capital, triggering an economic crisis that the country still hasn’t recovered from.
Curiously enough, many believed Israel had something to do with the devastating Beirut explosion – which was otherwise blamed on Hezbollah incompetence.
If anything has been demonstrated this week, it’s that anything that happens in Lebanon has to be scrutinized closely.
The country – which has been heavily destabilised in the last decade, arguably by both Israel and Iran – has been a repeat victim of asymmetric warfare.
People who pooh-poohed ‘conspiracy theories’ about the Beirut explosion at the time might now maybe rethink that dismissive attitude in light of this week’s events.
While this tech-based attack this week is regarded by some as asymmetric warfare, it is also psychological warfare – and arguably not just against Hezbollah or Lebanon.
Again, a lot of people unconnected to Lebanon or the Middle East have expressed alarm.
Take this well established Pegasus spyware designed to hack people’s phones and personal devices: and couple it with this evident ability to hijack manufacturing or distribution processes and even install explosive properties able to be triggered remotely… and why *wouldn’t* ordinary people now be far more paranoid or anxious about their devices?
Personally, I’ve always been a little wary of my devices anyway. But, like almost everyone on earth now, I’m still forced to use them, because so much of modern life is dependent on them.
Which is a perfect entrapment for all of us everywhere – but that’s a broader subject for some other time.
Again, Israel has opened a Pandora’s Box: and a lot more people’s eyes have been opened to a vulnerability they might not have previously thought about.
